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The hope that lower real interest rates and higher growth would follow the floatation of 
the Real was in large measure frustrated. Two international liquidity crises, caused by the 
reversal of capital flows, occurred in 2001 and 2002. These crises were associated with 
higher interest rates, lower economic activity, and higher inflation. Therefore, the term 
“exchange rate stagflation” seems to characterize the essence of this phenomenon. A 
stylized model by Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2002] explains these events. The main 
characteristic of the model is that domestic investment depends on the aggregate 
international liquidity of the economy, which is a limiting factor. During a liquidity crisis, 
liquidity is reduced, and the economy falls in recession. Neither the fiscal authority nor 
the monetary authority can reflate the economy by increasing government expenditures 
or the money supply.  
 
The bulk of the difficulties Brazil faced in 2002 stemmed from the uncertainty associated 
with the course of the future economic policy to be followed by the new administration 
and from the sustainability of the public debt. To avert a painful default, real interest rates 
must fall and sustained growth must resume. To increase the chances of success, several 
policy measures are suggested: 
•  To further the integration of Brazilian and international financial markets; 
•  To increase the exportability of the economy; 
•  To increase the fiscal effort, in order to help dispel the doubts over the 
sustainability of the public debt; 
•  To increase the credibility of the monetary authority, by conferring instrument 
independence to the Brazilian Central Bank; and 
•  To resume the debt management efforts to lengthen the debt profile while 
reducing the indexation to the exchange rate and to the Selic short term rate, by 
making larger use of inflation-linked bonds. 
When and if the international liquidity crisis is overcome, the above measures will help 
Brazil lower the real interest rates and achieve sustained growth. 
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With the Real Plan of July 1994, Brazil finally tamed inflation. Eight years later, inflation 
remains subdued, but real interest rates in Brazil still rank among the highest in the 
world. The high real interest rates harm public finances and also jeopardize the Brazilian 
economy’s growth prospects. The banking spread is also extremely high, making credit 
exceptionally expensive. Not surprisingly, outstanding credit provided by the financial 
sector remains below 25% of GDP
2.  Finance through equity is also small. The total 
Brazilian market capitalization is 122 billion of US dollars (USD).
3 The public sector 
remains the main attractor of private savings. The gross bonded domestic debt of the 
public sector has jumped from 11.5% to 39.5% of GDP in this eight-year period.
4  
 
For the financial sector to properly act as a support for sustained growth, several 
challenges loom ahead. Among those, this paper will deal with the fundamental question 
of how to lower the basic interest rate (Selic). This is a sine qua non condition both for 
the resumption of economic growth and for the sustainability of the public sector debt. 
 
Section 2 lays out the main stylized facts for Brazil during the floating exchange rate 
period (1999-2002). It also presents a decomposition of the domestic interest rates 
identifying the main components of the high real interest rate. These components, in turn, 
will be interpreted in light of the model of Section 3 to derive policy recommendations. 
 
Section 3 describes the IS-LM version of the model proposed by Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (CK) for emerging markets [2002]. We use this simple adaptation of the 
traditional Mundell-Fleming model to explain the events and policy reactions that marked 
the first years (1999-2002) of the floating exchange rate experience.  
 
Section 4 presents policy recommendations derived from the CK model aimed at 
reducing the real interest rate in the next years. Finally, Section 5 presents the 
conclusions. 
 
                                                 
2 See Brazilian Central Bank, Monetary Policy Press Release of 28/01/2003. 
3 See Bovespa, “Capitalização Bursátil,” Market Daily Bulletin of 27/12/2002. 
4 See Brazilian Central Bank, Fiscal Policy Press Release of 30/01/2003.   4 
2. 1999-2002: The floating exchange rate experience 
 
In this Section, we analyze the behavior of interest rates and of the exchange rate during 
the floating rate period of the Real Plan, which corresponds to the second term of 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Table 1 displays the main macroeconomic 
indicators of that period. 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002*
GDP Growth 0.8% 4.4% 1.5% 1.5%
Inflation (CPI) 8.9% 6.0% 7.7% 12.5%
Exchange Rate Depreciation 48.0% 9.3% 18.7% 52.3%
Nominal Interest Rate (Selic) 24.8% 17.4% 17.2% 19.2%
Real Interest Rate 14.6% 10.8% 8.9% 11.1%
Fiscal Surplus (%GDP)
              Primary 3.3% 3.6% 3.8% 3.9%
             Nominal -5.8% -3.6% -3.5% -4.6%
Current Account
             USD Billion -25.3 -24.2 -23.2 7.8
             %GDP -4.8% -4.1% -4.6% 1.7%
Table 1:  Macroeconomic Indicators of the Floating Period of the Real Plan
**
 
* Preliminary data. 
** Ex ante real Interest Rate computed with the nominal Selic target rate of 25%, set 
on 12/18/02 and with the median CPI inflation expectation for 2003 according to the 
Brazilian Central Bank weekly survey (available at www.bcb.gov.br). The ex post real 
interest rate for 2002 was 6%, since inflation unexpectedly surged in the last months. 
 
The second term of President Cardoso began with the change in the exchange rate 
regime. The Brazilian Real (BRL) was floated in January 1999. The inflation-targeting 
regime was introduced later in the second quarter. Also in marked contrast with the 1995-
98 period, the primary fiscal balance posted a significant improvement. Growth, 
however, faltered, and the current account balance, despite the earlier depreciations, only 
fell below the 4% of GDP threshold in 2002. 
 
The very high real interest rate, the low growth rate, the risky debt structure (which is 
highly indexed to the exchange rate and to the short term interest rate), and the 
recognition of hidden liabilities (the so called “skeletons in the closet”), made the net 
public debt to GDP ratio increase dramatically: from 30.4% in 1994 to 41.7% in 1998 
and 55.9%
5 in 2002.
6 The sustainability of the public debt depends not only on the 
capacity of keeping high primary fiscal surpluses, but also on the lowering of the real 
interest rate and on the resumption of growth.
7 
 
Chart 1, which displays the evolution of both the Selic (Left Hand Side (LHS) scale) and 
Fed Funds (Right Hand Side (RHS) scale) target rates, demonstrates two features of the 
                                                 
5 See Brazilian Central Bank, Fiscal Policy Press Release of 30/01/2003. 
6 See Garcia [2002] for a decomposition exercise of the debt growth. 
7 For debt simulations under different scenarios, see Goldfajn [2002].   5 
Brazilian monetary policy regime. First, the interest rate in Brazil is remarkably larger 
than its counterpart in the US (note the difference in the two scales). From the inflation 
data displayed in Table 1, it can be shown that these much higher nominal rates also 
translate in much higher real interest rates. Second, the changes in the interest rate targets 
display a clear negative correlation. As it is well known, monetary policy in the US 
operates counter-cyclically. However, Brazilian monetary policy is pro-cyclical, and is 
negatively correlated with the US’s. The model in Section 3 will aim at explaining these 
seemingly paradoxical stylized facts. 
 
In order to better understand the joint behavior of the exchange rate and interest rates, we 
perform a decomposition of Brazilian domestic interest rates according to the covered 
interest parity condition. This condition states that a US investor should be indifferent 
between investing in US bonds receiving the USD interest rate it*, and investing in 
Brazilian bonds receiving the BRL interest rate it, plus contracting the exchange rate 
forward, thereby insuring against exchange rate fluctuations, so that both returns in USD 
are the same.
8 The insurance premium is the depreciation rate computed by dividing the 
forward rate by the spot rate, also known as forward premium, fpt. The forward premium 
encompasses not only the expected depreciation Et(ln(ST/S0)), but also a risk premium, 
usually called currency risk, CURt.
9 Therefore, if the covered interest parity held, the 
domestic rate would equal the international interest rate plus the forward premium, i.e., 
Equation (1) would hold: 
 
t T t t t t t CUR S S E i fp i i + + = + = )) / (ln( 0
* *   (1). 
 
The analysis for Brazil uncovers a substantial positive residual once both the international 
interest rate and the forward premium are subtracted. This covered-interest-parity 
differential (CIPDt) is a measure of the country-risk.
10 Therefore, Equation (1) must be 
adapted to fit the Brazilian data: 
 
t t T t t t t t t CIPD CUR S S E i CIPD fp i i + + + = + + = )) / (ln( 0
* *   (2). 
 
Alternatively, sovereign bonds traded in international markets could be used to infer the 
country-risk. One of the most widely used measures of country-risk is the C-Bond spread, 
obtained from deducting the yield on US treasuries of the same duration from the yield 
offered by the C-Bond
11 in international secondary markets. We call this measure the 
country-risk, CORt, since it is a measure derived from secondary international markets, 
which are not directly affected by domestic monetary policy measures. The comparison 
                                                 
8 The same parity condition holds from the perspective of a Brazilian investor, since this condition also 
implies that BRL returns are equal. 
9 The currency risk may be negative, but this possibility is not relevant for Brazil. 
10 The differential (or deviation) of the covered interest rates parity
10 is the best measure of the lack of 
perfect capital mobility ...because it captures all barriers to integration of financial markets across 
national boundaries: transactions costs, information costs, capital controls, tax laws that discriminate by 
country of residence, default risk, and risk of future capital controls [Frankel, 1991]. 
11 Among the several bonds traded in the international market during the eight-year period, the C-Bond 
(Capitalization Bond) was the most liquid one, thereby being chosen as the benchmark.    6 
of the two measures of country-risk, CIPDt and CORt, has important consequences for the 
joint behavior of the exchange rate and the interest rate, as we will argue below. 
 
Chart 2A displays the interest rate decomposition described by Equation 2 from the time 
when President Cardoso took office in January 1995. The one-year nominal interest rate 
is the upper dark line. The one-year rate is usually higher than the basic rate (Selic) 
displayed in Table 1 because the yield curve has usually sloped upwards during the 
period studied. 
 
The one-year interest rate is decomposed in three series, according to Equation 2. The 
lower dark blue area is the one-year interest rate on US Treasuries, it*. On top of the 
international interest rate, the red area is the forward premium, fpt. Finally, the yellow 
residual is the covered-interest-parity differential, CIPDt. 
 
To better contrast the behavior of the CIPD with the C-Bond spread, these two series are 
displayed separately in Chart 2B. Although the two lines are country-risk measures, they 
should differ for several reasons, as analyzed in Garcia and Valpassos [2000]: 
 
1.  The maturity and duration of the bonds involved are different; the C-Bond’s being 
much longer than one year during the period studied. This effect is smaller the 
closer to the end of the period. 
2.  The tax treatment may be very different and it varies according to the investor. 
12 
3.  Capital controls (on capital inflows) affecting the domestic bonds were in place 
during the first half of the sample.
13 
4.  The credit risk (default risk) may be perceived to vary across debt types (domestic 
vs. foreign). I.e., investors may believe that there is an order of default, and 
domestic debt may be junior or senior in relation to foreign debt. 
5.  In the event of an exchange rate crisis, restrictions on capital outflows may be 
imposed. If this were done without defaulting on the debt, it would only affect 
foreign investors who purchased domestic debt, while those that acquired foreign 
debt would not be harmed.  
 
Despite all the reasons outlined above, the two Brazilian country-risk measures cannot 
drift too much apart without triggering financial strategies that revert the spread between 
the two to “normal”. In other words, if a negative shock—as an increase in the 
international investors risk aversion—increased the C-Bond spread, domestic interest 
rates would also have to rise. Otherwise, capital would flee the country, causing losses of 
foreign reserves (under the old crawling peg regime), or exchange rate depreciation 
(under the flexible exchange rate regime). In the first half of the sample, the crawling-peg 
period, the CIPD has systematically surpassed the C-Bond spread. Only during crises, 
when the C-Bond spread jumped upwards, has it been above the covered-interest-parity 
differential. 
 
                                                 
12 See Oliveira [1997]. 
13 See Garcia and Barcinski [1998].   7 
Salgado, Garcia, and Medeiros [2001] explain this behavior through a non-linear central 
bank reaction function. The argument is the following: the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) 
faced two different constraints. In “good times,” foreign capital was plentiful, and the 
central bank reaction function did not take into consideration the pressure from the 
exchange rate (since it was a crawling peg, the pressure would materialize in a loss of 
foreign reserves to preserve the peg). During those periods, the BCB would act as a 
developed country central bank, concerned only with the inflation expectation and with 
the output gap. During crises, however, the loss of reserves necessary to preserve the peg 
would trigger another channel (call it the exchange rate channel) that would make interest 
rates jump upwards. Typically, as shown in Chart 2B, the C-Bond spread is the first to 
jump, and the CIPD moves later when domestic interest rates are raised to avoid further 
foreign reserves losses. Therefore, the increase in the difference between the C-Bond 
spread and the CIPD has served as a very good coincidental, and sometimes leading, 
indicator of crises. 
 
After a turbulent initial period that followed the floatation of the BRL in January 1999, 
the relationship between the two country-risk measures was reversed: the C-Bond spread 
became systematically larger than the CIPD. Two possible reasons for that were the large 
increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) and the much lower inflow of short-term-
arbitrage-funds to invest in Brazilian domestic debt. This suggests that the difference 
between the C-Bond spread and the CIPD—given all the taxes, legal restrictions, and 
perceived risks involved—was enough to prevent capital flight, but not enough to attract 
foreign funds as in the previous period.
14 
 
Chart 3 displays the interest rate decomposition data in a different format, more akin to 
the model of Section 3. It covers the period from January 2000 to April 2002. The year of 
2000 was the only good year of the flexible regime. During 2000, the basic interest rate 
(Selic)—the dark green line (LHS scale)—fell throughout the year, and the exchange 
rate—the yellow area in the background (RHS scale)—stabilized. The slope of the yield 
curve is measured by the difference between the one-year interest rate—the black line 
(LHS scale)—and the Selic rate. The yield curve was not very steep,
15 and even became 
inverted during brief periods, signaling the expectation of further fall in interest rates. 
 
In Chart 3, the one-year interest rate is decomposed in two parts: the forward premium—
the red line (LHS scale)—, corresponding to the depreciation one-year ahead; and the 
domestic USD rate—the blue line (LHS scale)—, corresponding to the yield one gets by 
investing in a domestic bond indexed to the USD. I.e., one can either get a nominal rate 
                                                 
14 It is likely that the exchange rate volatility introduced by the new regime increased the risks involved in 
the financial strategy known as carry trade. This strategy consists of borrowing in low-yielding currency, 
exchanging the proceeds into a high-yielding currency and reverting the trade at the end. The gain is the 
difference in interest rates. If the low-yielding currency depreciates vis-à-vis the high-yielding currency, 
there is an additional capital gain. However, if the high-yielding currency depreciates, then the interest rate 
differential may be wiped out. 
15 Liquidity for BRL-denominated government bonds without indexation clauses has always been very low 
for maturities longer than one year. This is an example of the so-called original sin, i.e., the extreme 
difficulty in having a long-term credit market in the domestic currency (see Goldfajn and Rigobon [2000]).   8 
in BRL, or buy a bond that pays the actual (ex-post) depreciation plus the USD domestic 
rate. In terms of the variables in Equation (2), the domestic USD rate equals t t CIPD i +
* . 
 
The C-Bond yield is also included as the brown line (LHS scale). Finally, the difference 
between the C-Bond spread and the CIPD is portrayed as the purple line (LHS scale). 
During 2000, the forward premium and the USD domestic rate were both falling, evenly 
splitting the BRL domestic rate.
16 The C-Bond yield remained stable. In early January 
2001, the COPOM
17 cut the Selic target to 15.25%, the lowest rate since the start of the 
Real Plan. 
 
Unfortunately, a sequence of domestic and international events
18 hindered the resumption 
of economic growth. After March 2001, it became clear that the good times were gone. 
The country-risk, as measured by the C-Bond spread, started trending upwards. The 
domestic interest rates also reacted. The Selic was increased several times, and the yield 
curve steepened drastically. The large increase in the one-year interest rate, can be fully 
attributed to the hike in the forward premium. The USD domestic rate actually fell during 
2001, increasing the difference between the two country-risk measures.
19 Until 
September 2001, the exchange rate depreciated continually. 
 
The immense liquidity that was injected by the US Federal Reserve (Fed) after 
September 11, 2001 allowed the situation to improve until the first quarter of 2002. The 
C-Bond yield fell to its previous level, while the exchange rate appreciated. Interest rates 
fell, and the yield curve flattened. 
 
However, not everything had reverted to the configuration that prevailed one year before. 
The forward premium remained at a much higher level, warning that the exchange rate 
appreciation was not to be seen as a long-lasting phenomenon. The difference between 
the two measures of country-risk was also large, signaling that “quasi-arbitrage” financial 
strategies involving capital outflows remained. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that another negative combination of 
domestic and international events created a confidence crisis that made the country-risk 
explode after April 2002. Chart 4 displays what happened during the second crisis bout. 
 
                                                 
16 This is most likely just a coincidence. 
17 Comitê de Política Monetária (Monetary Policy Committee), the Brazilian equivalent of the FOMC 
(Federal Open Market Committee). 
18 On the domestic side there were the energy crisis and the political disarray inside the government 
coalition. On the international side, it became clear that the US economy entered a recession and the 
Argentina crisis worsened considerably, bringing contagion to Brazil. 
19 At least in theory, this high spread between the two country-risk measures, subject to the previous 
caveats, could have given rise to “good-deal arbitrages”. Such a financial strategy was accomplished 
through the purchase of the C-Bond or other external securities with Brazilian country-risk while shorting 
the domestic dollar-indexed securities, i.e., by borrowing in the domestic USD rate and converting the 
proceeds in USD to purchase the C-Bond in the international secondary market. The existence of this quasi-
arbitrage opportunity during a long period was probably due to restrictions on capital outflows that limit the 
ability of domestic firms and financial institutions to remit funds abroad.   9 
As during the 2001 crisis, the one-year interest rate rose along with the increase in the 
country-risk. Nevertheless, the COPOM decided to keep the downward movement in the 
Selic rate, justifying this move with the ensuing recession and a low pass-through from 
exchange rate depreciation to inflation. The Selic target was raised by 300 basis points 
(bps), from 18% to 21%, only on October 14, 2002. The decomposition of the increase in 
the one-year interest rate during the second crisis bout, however, reveals a completely 
opposite picture from the 2001 crisis. In 2002, the one-year interest rise was entirely due 
to the increase in the domestic USD rate, which lagged behind the C-Bond yield during 
the previous year. Simultaneously, in a clear indication that markets expected an 
appreciation of the BRL, the forward premium decreased substantially, even becoming 
negative.
20  A negative forward premium is akin to a lower forward exchange rate 
compared to the spot exchange rate.
21 The BRL/USD exchange rate overshot, 
depreciating 70%, before closing the year around 50%.
22 The real exchange rate was at 
the most depreciated level in the last three decades, a period that included several 
depreciation episodes and international financial crises. 
 
The decomposition of the forward premium into the expected depreciation and the 
currency risk sheds more light in the joint behavior of interest rates and the exchange 
rate. However, the separation of the two components is not a clear-cut procedure. First, 
the expected inflation is itself a theoretical construct, since market players may disagree 
in their expectations. Even if we agree upon the existence of an expected inflation 
variable, the empirical literature points out the existence of a severe bias in survey data 
(see Chinn and Frankel [1994]). Alternatively, econometric methods may be used to 
disentangle the two components (see Garcia and Olivares [2001]). 
 
Notwithstanding the previous caveats, a survey
23 compiled by the BCB is used to 
decompose the forward premium in the expected depreciation and the currency risk. The 
results are presented in Chart 5. The forward premium is the red line (LHS scale); the 
expected depreciation, the dark green line (LHS scale); and the currency risk, the light 
blue line (LHS scale). On the RHS scale is the exchange rate, as shown by the yellow in 
the background. 
 
Chart 5 shows that during the 2001 depreciation episode, the forward premium increase 
was due to the hike in the currency risk, while expected depreciation became negative.
24 
The same movements happened during the 2002 crisis, except that the expected 
depreciation became much more negative, while the currency risk still increased vis-à-vis 
the calm interim between the two exchange rate depreciation episodes. Chart 5 
                                                 
20 This “expected” appreciation could be a sheer market outcome or a result of future measures that 
restricted capital outflows. 
21 In market parlance, the forward market is said to be in backwardation. 
22 In terms of the USD/BRL exchange rate, the dollar appreciation at the overshooting peak was 42%, 
ending the year with an appreciation of 35%. 
23 See Brazilian Central Bank, Focus-Market Readout of 10/18/2002. 
24 If agents believed that the exchange rate is a martingale (or a random walk), thereby issuing forecasts 
equal to the current values, and if these forecasts were measured with a lag, we would get expected 
appreciation when the currency is depreciating, and expected depreciation when the currency is 
appreciating.   10 
demonstrates that the currency risk premium has almost always been positive,
25 even in 
periods of large expected appreciation of the BRL. 
 
As Chart 4 shows, during the 2002 depreciation episode, the USD domestic rate became 
larger than the BRL domestic interest rate. Consequently, the forward premium became 
negative. Since there is an arbitrage between the domestic rate in BRL and the domestic 
rate in USD plus exchange rate indexation, the negative forward premium caused the 
yield curve in instruments indexed to the exchange rate to stay above the yield curve for 
BRL instruments. This effect is higher the shorter the instrument, since rates are 
annualized. For example, if the 1 month forward premium is –5%, an investor who 
purchased a USD indexed instrument would have to get at least a 5% a month, or 60% 
per year, just to break-even.
26 
 
Chart 6 displays the yield curves for BRL and USD-indexed domestic instruments on 
October 22, 2002. For maturities equal to or less than one year, the USD domestic yield 
curve is higher than the BRL domestic yield curve. This is a very unusual situation that 
signaled the extreme scarcity of foreign liquidity in Brazilian domestic markets. 
 
In summary, the stylized facts are the following: 
 
1.  In both of the large depreciation episodes in 2001 and 2002, the country-risk 
measure given by the C-Bond spread increased, although the increase was much 
more pronounced in the latter episode than in the former. This latter episode is 
associated with large exchange rate outflows from Brazil in fear of a possible 
future default on the public debt.  
2.  In the 2001 episode, the CIPD and the domestic USD interest rate decreased, 
while they increased significantly during the 2002 episode. Conversely, the 
forward premium increased substantially in 2001, and became negative in 2002. 
3.  The negative forward premium gave rise to an inverted yield curve of USD 
domestic rates that surpassed the BRL yield curve for maturities up to one-year. 
4.  The 2002 depreciation created an expectation of nominal appreciation of the BRL, 
a very unusual situation. Nevertheless, the currency risk remained positive in both 
depreciation episodes. 
 
An alternative way to put the above facts is the following: the extreme scarcity of foreign 
liquidity in the 2002 crisis substantially increased the return in USD domestic 
instruments. Because of no arbitrage, either the domestic interest rate would have to 
increase much more than it did, or an expected appreciation of the BRL would have to be 
generated. For this to happen—and given that the long term equilibrium real exchange 
rate should have also depreciated because of the worse prospects of capital inflows—, the 
BRL/USD exchange rate had to overshoot. The model in the next section will help to 
interpret some of the facts, and to derive policy recommendations. 
                                                 
25 Except for a brief period around the end of March 2000, when the exchange rate reached a trough. 
26 Simple interest is used because these financial contracts are traded with this interest rate convention.   11 
3. A version of the CK model for segmented financial markets 
 
The fundamental characteristic for a model to adequately represent the events described 
in the previous section is the imperfect integration (segmentation) between the Brazilian 
domestic market and international financial markets. Here we resort to the simplest 
version of the dual liquidity models developed by Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2002].
27 
This static simple model is akin to the traditional Mundell-Fleming IS-LM-BP model
28 
with a restriction on the amount of foreign liquidity that can be used as collateral for 
foreign capital inflows. 
 
To simplify, CK assumes a small open economy where all private investment and public 
outlays must be foreign-financed, i.e.: 
 
I + G = CF (3) 
 
where I is domestic investment, G is government outlays, and CF is net capital inflows.
29 
Given this simplifying assumption, an external crisis is a situation where there is not 
enough capital flows to implement the desired levels of investment and public outlays. 
I.e., the economy is restricted by the availability of foreign capital inflows. CK assumes 
that, during crises, the economy has an insufficient amount of international liquidity 
(financial claims on futures cash flows that can be sold to foreign and domestic lenders 
alike), IL. Loans backed by international liquidity are made at the international rate i*. 
Inequality (4)—always valid—holds as equality in a crisis: 
 
I + G ≤  IL  (4). 
 
The sole function of the domestic financial market is to redistribute international liquidity 
among domestic agents, since the domestic owners of international liquidity are not 
necessarily those with investment projects. Domestic agents may borrow from other 
domestic agents according to their domestic liquidity, DL, which is a decreasing function 
of the domestic interest rate, i
p.
30 When a firm borrows international liquidity from a 
domestic agent, it pays a domestic rate indexed to the currency depreciation, call it, the 
domestic dollar rate, i
d. 
 
Investment is a decreasing function of both rates i
p and i
d. Since i
d is the firm’s cost of 
capital, the higher the i
d, the lower the investment. When the central bank tightens 
                                                 
27 See also Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2001a, 2001b, 2001c, and 2001d]. 
28 See Williamson [1986] and Blanchard and Fischer [1989].  
29 In fact, all that is needed is that domestic absorption be larger than national output, generating a need for 
external savings (current account deficits). 
30 In Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2002], the superscript p stands for peso. We opted not to substitute the 
real rate for the peso rate to avoid the possible confusion between the name of the Brazilian currency and 
the adjective real.   12 
monetary policy, i.e., increases i
p, the present value of future cash flows falls, reducing 
DL, the collateral firms can offer, thereby reducing investment, ceteris paribus.
31  
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(5). 
 
The CK model of emerging markets’ crises is better understood with the help of Figures 
1A and 1B, where i
d and G are taken as given for the moment. The horizontal axis is I+G, 
which in this simplified framework determines the domestic absorption. According to 
inequality (4), I+G is limited by the amount of international liquidity, represented in 
Figure 1 by the reversed-L shaped supply curve. A crisis is a reduction of the amount of 
IL, which forces firms to reduce aggregate investment. 
 
( ) IL G i , i I
p d = +   (6). 
 
As shown in Figure 1A, the reduction in IL forces the dollar rate, i
d up, above the 
international rate, i0*. This does not represent an arbitrage opportunity for foreign 
investors because the amount of internationally accepted collateral is limited. Foreign 
loans have to be fully collateralized with international liquidity. Figure 1B represents the 
usual modeling of crises, where an external shock increases the risk premium, increasing 
i
d. While the same amount of aggregate investment could be produced with both models 
for the appropriate rescaling of the parameters, the key difference is that the supply of 
capital flows in the upper panel is completely inelastic, as opposed to the lower panel, 
where the supply of capital flows is completely elastic at the higher rate. This inability of 
higher dollar rates to increase the capital inflows will generate a completely new set of 
results that conforms to most stylized facts of the Brazilian experience, as it will be 
shown. Certainly, no supply is completely inelastic. However, anecdotal evidence 
supports the conjecture that the extremely large country-risk premium (above 2500 bps) 
on Brazilian sovereign bonds in 2002 was a result of quantitative restrictions.
32  
 
A domestic investor with a unit of international liquidity may either lend this unit to 
another domestic agent, receiving the domestic dollar rate, i
d, or convert this unit in 
domestic currency and invest it at the domestic interest rate, i
p. The domestic interest 
parity condition that corresponds to the non-arbitrage condition of a domestic investor 
that possesses one unit of international liquidity is given by Equation (7), where ê is the 
expected appreciation of the domestic currency.  
 
ê i i
p d + =  (7) 
 
                                                 
31 We could simply assume that higher domestic interest rates would lower domestic absorption. However, 
since CK assumed that investment is fully financed from abroad, this domestic credit channel is needed. 
32 A few large international banks that used to do the short term carry trade in Brazil simply stopped doing 
such “arbitrage” strategies after April 2002. Also, trade credit lines, which remained even during the worst 
moments of the previous crises, were severely curtailed after April 2002.   13 
If the domestic dollar rate rises, either the monetary authority has to tighten monetary 
policy by raising i
p, or an expected appreciation must be generated.
33 Future expected 
appreciation is generated through the current depreciation of the spot exchange rate 
(overshooting). The depreciation causes the dollar value of all domestic assets to fall, i.e., 
even though the future cash flows may remain the same, prices in dollar of, say, domestic 
stocks fall just because the economy lacks international liquidity. 
 
 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2002] models the monetary side with a simplified LM 
curve, Equation (8). Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium in both the goods and the money 
markets. The standard model is represented by the IS’ curve, while the CK model curve 
is IS, where the vertical segment follows from the limited IL. 
 
( ) M G I , i L
p
= +   (8) 
 
Figures 1A and 2, together with Equation (7) determine the equilibrium of the investment 
plus government outlays level, the domestic interest rate, the domestic dollar rate and the 
exchange rate. 
 
                                                 
33 Since this simple static model does not consider uncertainty, the expected appreciation must equal the 
actual one. 
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Figure 1(B): External Crises: The Standard Model   14 
 
 
This simple model is sufficient to exemplify some of the new results arising from 
assuming the segmentation of the domestic and the international financial markets. For 
example, in the standard model, an expansionary monetary policy, by moving the LM to 
the right and reducing the domestic interest rate, i
p, raises firms’ net worth, relaxing their 
domestic financial constraint, thereby increasing investment. In the CK model, that does 
not happen because the model assumes that, during crises, the aggregate level of 
investment depends solely on IL. If, during a crisis, the monetary authority tries to reflate 
the economy by increasing money supply, it will create the aggregate effect of having all 
firms (now with a higher net worth, or DL in domestic currency) bidding higher for the 
fixed international liquidity, in order to invest more. It will only shift up the I(i
d, i
p) 
schedule in Figure 1A, thereby raising i
d, and further depreciating the exchange rate 
through the domestic interest parity condition, Equation (7). 
 
The broken curve in Figure 3 shows the impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate 
in the CK model. The steeper segment corresponds to the non-crisis regime, where, 
according to the domestic interest parity condition, a decrease in the domestic interest 
rate causes the exchange rate to depreciate, while the domestic dollar rate remains fixed. 
However, when the amount of international liquidity becomes binding, further decreases 
in the domestic interest rate cause the domestic dollar rate to increase, requiring 
additional depreciation of the domestic currency. 
 
  Figure 2: Equilibrium 
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Regarding fiscal policy, the CK model also delivers contrasting results to those of the 
standard Mundell-Fleming model. The CK model introduces a new crowding-out effect, 
since investment and government outlays are competitors for the restricted international 
liquidity during crises. An increase in government outlays increases the domestic dollar 
rate, causing exchange rate depreciation. The contrast becomes even stronger under a 
fixed exchange rate regime with perfect capital mobility. In that case, the usual Mundell-
Fleming model would predict that an increase in government outlays would create an 
incipient increase of the domestic interest rate, thereby attracting capital inflows that 
would appreciate the currency. To prevent the appreciation, the central bank would 
expand money, driving down the domestic interest rate to the previous international level. 
This causes the output to expand without the traditional crowding out effect. In the CK 
model, however, the increase in government outlays creates an incipient depreciation, 
because of the increase in the domestic dollar rate, while nothing happens to output. To 
keep the peg, the central bank has to increase the domestic interest rate (decrease the 
money supply). 
 
Finally, more sophisticated versions of the CK model allows for the study of welfare 
effects of ex-ante policy options. The idea is that private agents face a trade-off while 
contemplating the alternative uses of a unit of international liquidity. It may be invested 
at the domestic dollar rate or used to import investment goods. A free-rider externality 
keeps the domestic dollar rate below the social value of an extra unit of international 
liquidity, thereby creating over-borrowing in good times that, which reduces the amount 
of international liquidity during crises. This market failure may be corrected in three 
different ways: the central bank may keep extra foreign reserves, it may tax the capital 
inflows, or it may commit to expansionary monetary policy during crises. Such 
commitment of lowering the domestic interest rate during the crisis would increase the 
domestic dollar rate towards its social optimal level. As Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
[2001] points out, however, such policy is time inconsistent. 
 
As it will be discussed in the next section, these results are important in understanding the 
rationale of the BCB’s actions under an inflation-targeting regime, as well as most of the 
movements in asset prices. 
  Figure 3: The Relationship between the Domestic Interest 
Rate and the Exchange Rate 
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4. How to reduce the real interest rate? 
 
The simple model depicted in the previous Section shows that the high real interest rates 
are not a result of “irrational” monetary policy, as some have claimed.
34 If the BCB had 
tried to reflate the economy out of the recession in the middle of an international liquidity 
crisis, all it would have obtained is further exchange rate depreciation, which in turn 
would have caused more inflation and no growth. If the basic interest rate (Selic) were to 
fall substantially, it would prompt larger capital outflows and further currency 
depreciation, which would fuel inflation. In the short run, the current account would 
adjust mainly through a decline in imports, since exports take time to increase. 
Investment would not pick up, since macroeconomic uncertainty would increase. 
Consumption could increase, but that alone would not lead to sustained growth. In 
summary, in this exchange-rate-led stagflation, the Brazilian economy would have more 
inflation without being able to resume growth.  
 
The shortage of capital flows causes the exchange rate to depreciate and the real interest 
rate to rise, negatively affecting economic activity and inflation. This powerful 
transmission channel of the business cycle in emerging markets—which works through 
the exchange rate—has been of little or no relevance in developed economies. For 
example, the fear of massive capital outflows
35 has never entered in the realm of the 
practical considerations that geared the Fed’s decisions of lowering interest rates to 
reflate the economy. This, however, is a luxury that emerging market central banks 
cannot afford. Reflating a recessionary economy in times of high-risk aversion is a 
procedure that is not found in emerging markets’ monetary policy manuals. The CK 
model captures the essence of the difference between an economy integrated in the 
international financial markets and an economy where international liquidity is binding. 
 
The risk factors that account for the high real interest rate have to be addressed to obtain 
its sustained reduction. The stylized facts outlined in Section 2 show that, even in a 
context of segmented financial markets, there is a connection between the domestic 
interest rates and the secondary market yields of the foreign debt, as predicted by the 
covered interest parity condition with country-risk (Equation (2)). Therefore, the 
                                                 
34 A few Brazilian economists have written that the interest rate is so high because the market knows less 
than the Central Bank and reads between the lines of the Central Bank’s actions to infer the amount of 
default risk. The Central Bank, according to the argument, has the power of choosing: if it signals high 
default risk through a high interest rate, that is what the market will believe. If, however, it signals low 
default risk through a low interest rate, the market will charge a low default risk premium. I do not think 
that asymmetric information is at the heart of the problem of the very high interest rate in Brazil, and 
therefore do not agree with this reasoning.  In their assessment of this point, Favero and Giavazzi [2002] 
say that “… the experience of other countries which have successfully made the transition to a ‘good’ 
equilibrium suggests that one should not rely on such a transition happening automatically: Brazil may 
have to raise its primary surplus further, at least for some time, before the transition to a good equilibrium 
will allow the government to relax fiscal policy. A temporary increase in the primary surplus should be 
seen as an investment: the returns will justify the temporary sacrifice with a vengeance.” 
35 The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report [2002] raises doubts on whether or not “… the United 
States will continue to attract and distribute substantial shares of international capital.”   17 
reduction in the domestic real rate has to happen in the context of a reversal of the 
extremely high secondary market yields of the Brazilian foreign debt. 
 
A large body of literature has been dedicated to uncover the explanatory factors of 
country-risk spreads.
36 The characteristics of the domestic economy as well as the 
conditions of the international financial markets usually explain the bulk of the spreads. 
Garcia and Didier’s [2002] attempt to explain the time-series behavior of the Brazilian 
country-risk indicates that the expectations for the future path of the fiscal and current 
account balances, as well as the conditions of the domestic and international financial 
markets are able to account for large part of the variance. 
 
There is not much that domestic policies can do to improve the state of extreme risk 
aversion in international markets. However, the behavior of the Brazilian country-risk has 
been much worse than the average emerging markets bond index, measured by the JP 
Morgan family of Emerging Market Bond Indices (EMBI).  This is an indication that 
domestic actions may potentially play a large role in reducing the country-risk spread. 
 
The 2002 “explosion” of the country-risk spread, which surpassed the 2500 bps 
threshold, was in large measure due to the uncertainty of the presidential election. 
Investors feared that the election of then front-runner candidate Luís Inácio Lula da Silva 
would be followed by a public debt default. As of early March 2003, the uncertainty in 
this regard has been considerably reduced as President Lula da Silva unveiled a set of 
orthodox economic policies, as well as nominated market-friendly names as members of 
his economic team. If the new administration sticks to the terms of the IMF agreement, 
both in deeds and words, the country-risk spread is bound to fall, especially considering 
that pre-election bond prices were highly depressed due to the fear of abandonment of 
austere fiscal and monetary policies. Such result is consistent with the multiple 
equilibrium model developed by Razin and Sadka [2002], where “… an external 
correction of the country’s credit rating can be self-validated in the sense that it could 
reduce the country’s prime rate, restore investment and shrink the fiscal deficit.” If, 
however, lax fiscal and monetary policies are followed, the country-risk spread will not 
fall and no reduction in real interest rate can occur barring heterodox measures as 
controls on capital outflows.
37 
 
But the challenges that loom ahead for the new president are more complex than merely 
maintaining the policies of his predecessor’s second term. Even before the uncertainty 
generated by the presidential elections became an issue, the country-risk spread was 
already high. During the good year of 2000, the behavior of the interest rate risk 
components analyzed in Section 2 reveal that much more has to be achieved in order to 
reduce the real interest rate and resume sustained growth. 
 
                                                 
36 See, for example, Bekaert et al. [1996], Duffie et al. [2001], and Cruces et al. [2002]. 
37 Lower (even negative) real interest rates may result from financial repression if exchange rate controls 
are introduced (McKinnon [1973]). However, such scenario will not be analyzed, as it would not bring the 
ultimate objective of sustained economic growth.   18 
In their study of the causes of the high interest rates in Brazil, Favero and Giavazzi 
[2002] conclude that: 
 
future expected monetary policy plays a very small role in explaining fluctuations of interest rates 
at longer maturities. (…) Such term premia are strongly correlated with Brady bond spreads, 
which are not (at least directly) affected by devaluation expectations. We conclude that 
macroeconomic fundamentals and debt dynamics are the main determinants of the term spread of 
Brazilian rates. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that after the large depreciation of 2002, the 
pass-through coefficient from the exchange rate depreciation to inflation is much higher 
than previously estimated,
38 causing a surge in inflation. That prompted the BCB to raise 
the Selic rate from 18% in October, 2002 to 26.5% in February, 2003.  Such a gargantuan 
increase in interest rates would probably justify the large term premia present in the data. 
Therefore, Favero and Giavazzi’s [2002] econometric results suffered from a small 
sample bias akin to the Peso Problem.
39  
 
In any case, their vector auto-regression (VAR) exercise is flawed because it excludes the 
exchange rate. Chart 7 makes it clear that not only the C-Bond spread is highly positively 
correlated with the one-year-term premium (the difference between the one-year interest 
rate and the Selic rate),
40 but also that both are highly positively correlated to the 
exchange rate.
41 By excluding the exchange rate from their simulation model of future 
Selic rates, Favero and Giavazzi [2002] overlooks the effect of the exchange rate channel 
on domestic inflation, which feeds into the central bank reaction function. 
 
The hypothesis of how term premia are formed is the following: the increase in the 
country-risk premium reflects the reduction of international liquidity, which in Figure 1A 
would be seen as a shift of the vertical part of L-shaped curve.  By the domestic interest 
parity condition, Equation (7), the rise in the domestic dollar rate, in the absence of a 
monetary policy tightening, causes the exchange rate to depreciate. Large depreciations 




The BCB must then react to the increase in both the expected inflation and in inflation 
uncertainty. Market participants may form different beliefs as to what such reaction will 
be. The key point, however, is that all (possibly different) beliefs lead to the same 
(qualitative) conclusion that the nominal interest rate for medium term (six-months to 
two-years) will rise. 
 
                                                 
38 The nonlinear nature of the pass-through coefficient seems to be responsible for the downward 
estimation bias.  See Carneiro, Monteiro, and Wu [2002]. 
39 See Lewis [1995]. 
40 The simple correlation coefficient is 0.78. 
41 The simple correlation coefficients are 0.84 (exchange rate and C-bond spread) and 0.79 (exchange rate 
and one-year-term premium). 
42 The high inflation numbers observed by the last quarter of 2002 seem to corroborate the non-linear 
behavior of the pass-through coefficient (see note 37).   19 
To illustrate the above argument, consider that, given the increase in expected inflation 
and in inflation uncertainty, two mutually exclusive and opposite beliefs are formed as to 
how the BCB will react. One belief is that the central bank will stick to the inflation-
targeting framework. The BCB will have to increase the Selic rate in the future to 
counteract the rise in inflation expectation, leading to both higher nominal and real 
interest rates. The nominal rate rises immediately and falls in the future as inflation 
expectations decrease. Since monetary policy is believed to take more than nine months 
to take effect, the average nominal rate increases for the six-month to two-year 
maturities.  
 
Conversely, the alternative belief is that the necessarily tight monetary policy will not be 
pursued, and actual inflation will rise. The real interest rate will fall, and will keep falling 
as long as inflation expectations rise. Eventually, the nominal interest rate will have to be 
raised to avoid the capital flight associated with very low or negative real interest rates. 
Since inflation may grow unboundedly, Selic rates in the future would be extremely high, 
ultimately leading to a very steep yield curve. 
 
Therefore, both scenarios lead to higher nominal rates for the six-month to two-year 
maturities, possibly explaining the shift in the term premia. Furthermore, the size of the 
term premium is positively related to the probability attributed that the BCB will revert to 
loose monetary policies. Unlike in developed economies, Brazilians have a fresh 
experience with hyperinflation. Indexation could come back very fast, quickly propping 
inflation to high numbers. In such a scenario, even low or negative real rates would be 
associated with much higher nominal interest rates in the medium term. If this hypothesis 
is true, the loss of credibility of the monetary authority would probably lead to even 
higher term premia, since loose monetary policies are associated with higher future 
inflation rates. 
 
Compared to 2001, the 2002 depreciation episode also revealed a very different behavior 
in bond prices. In 2001 the depreciation was associated with a slight fall of the USD 
domestic rate, while in 2002 the (larger) depreciation was associated with a large increase 
in the USD domestic rate, as predicted by the CK model in the event of an international 
liquidity crisis. The different behavior is probably linked to the role of domestic-USD-
indexed instruments as hedging instruments for domestic agents, which is not modeled in 
the CK model. The perfect foresight version of uncovered interest parity used in the CK 
model—Equation (7)—does not have all the elements of the covered interest parity with 
country-risk—Equation (2).  
 
Suppose that agents incorporate the workings of the CK model in their behavior. In that 
case, they know that times of international liquidity crises are associated with low output 
and large depreciations, but the majority cannot diversify away this risk. Therefore, 
exchange rate depreciation constitutes a systemic risk for domestic agents. When an 
international liquidity crisis is expected to hit, the price of the insurance against the   20 
systemic bad shock increases, i.e., the USD domestic dollar rate tends to fall.
43 This 
effect, absent in the CK model, tends to offset the increase of the USD domestic rate 
stemming from the smaller supply of international liquidity, given the domestic 
investment schedule. In 2001, the former effect slightly dominated. However, in 2002, 
the international liquidity shortage was much higher,
44 and the prevailing effect was the 
one modeled by the CK model. Also, in 2002, fears of the Brazilian government 
defaulting on the debt were widespread, which reduced the effectiveness of USD-indexed 
government bonds as systemic hedges. Looking at Equation (2) and Chart 4 we can see 
that for the price of the exchange rate depreciation hedge to fall, i.e., for the USD 
domestic rate to increase, the exchange rate overshot, creating a negative forward 
premium. 
 
In both cases, however, the depreciation was large, harming domestic output and 
inflation. The extreme vulnerability to external financial shocks is the Achilles’ heel of 
the Brazilian economy. Without properly addressing it, sustained growth will continue to 
be elusive.  While the enormous real depreciation that happened from 1999 to 2002 
caused the trade balance and the current account balance to improve, as shown in Table 
1, the cost of this is higher inflation rates and lower growth. The structure of the economy 
must be improved to allow a better trade-off for the monetary authority. 
 
As explained above, the credibility of the BCB`s inflation targeting regime is at the heart 
of the large term premium of Brazilian interest rates, ultimately harming economic 
growth. It goes without saying that improving credibility, by conferring instrument 
independence to the BCB, would be of great help. However, it would probably not be 
enough. It is necessary to reduce what has been called external vulnerability. As argued 
before, this is extremely relevant to enable the BCB to set interest rates compatible with 
economic investment and sustained growth. 
 
Bacha [2002] refers to three, possibly complementary, ways of making emerging market 
economies less prone to exchange rate crises. The “global option” would be the creation 
of an international lender of last resort. However, this option would not be politically 
viable in the near future. The “regional option” would be “… the establishment of a free 
trade area in the Americas, accompanied by full dollarization.” Given the reluctance of 
the US in letting international concerns intervene with its monetary policy, this option 
would likewise be of little immediate use. Finally, there would be measures at the 
national level, mainly “… to deepen and further long-term domestic financial markets, 
thus making the investment process less dependent on foreign finance.” This would 
require an improvement in the long-term financial market, and an increase in the 
economy’s “exportability.” 
 
This last point can again be illustrated with the CK model. If the amount of international 
liquidity of the economy is made to depend positively in the exchange rate, i.e., 
                                                 
43 An USD-linked domestic bond provides hedge against the exchange rate depreciation. The higher 
demand for exchange rate depreciation hedge builds up the bond’s price, thereby lowering its yield, the 
USD domestic rate. 
44 As previously mentioned, even trade credit lines are reported to have been slashed.   21 
depreciations increase net future cash flows in foreign currencies by improving the trade 
balance, then international liquidity crisis will not be as severe. The strength of this effect 
depends on the alluded “exportability” of the economy, which is very low in Brazil.
45 
Therefore, increasing the tradable sector in the economy is fundamental to allowing 
better trade-offs to the central bank, which translates into lower average interest rates.  
 
Unfortunately, this point is commonly misunderstood. For example, all the contenders in 
the 2002 presidential election, including President Lula, had in their economic programs 
“import substitution” as the main policy to deal with the external vulnerability. Although 
import substitution and export promotion may both lead to lower current-account deficits, 
the emphasis on import substitution is completely mistaken. After all, the goal is to have 
a (much) higher portion of the output that is “exportable”, i.e., which both meets the 
quality standards and is competitively produced (without subsidies). Import substitution 
promotion schemes in the past have led to low quality and high prices, while requiring 
large subsidies. If such policy slippage materializes, it will further jeopardize growth 
prospects. 
 
Finally, much has been debated about the sustainability of the Brazilian public debt. 
Although this issue is not addressed in this paper,
46 it is clear that the increase in the 
perceived credit risk was responsible for the bulk of the “explosion” of the country-risk. 
When and if the crisis initiated in 2001-02 comes to an end, special attention must be 
paid to lowering the fragility of the debt structure, which today is mostly short-term and 
indexed to the Selic interest rate or to the exchange rate. The use of inflation-linked 
bonds, as the Chilean economy has been successfully using for decades, seems to be the 
least costly way to lengthen the debt maturity, thereby reducing risk and the interest rate. 
                                                 
45 Brazil’s Export to GDP ratio has seldom surpassed 10%. 
46 See Garcia [2002], Goldfajn [2002], and Goldstein [2003].   22 
5. Conclusion 
 
Even after adopting the flexible exchange rate regime, Brazil suffered two major 
depreciation episodes in 2001 and 2002. These episodes were caused by the reversal of 
capital flows, and were associated with higher interest rates, lower economic activity and 
higher inflation. Therefore, the name “exchange rate stagflation” seems to characterize 
the essence of the phenomenon. 
 
In order to explain the exchange rate stagflation, a stylized model, due to Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy [2002], was used. The main characteristic of the model is that domestic 
investment depends on the aggregate international liquidity of the economy, which is a 
limiting factor. During a liquidity crisis, the amount of aggregate international liquidity is 
reduced, and the economy falls in recession. Neither the fiscal authority nor the monetary 
authority can reflate the economy by increasing government expenditures or the money 
supply. Either action results in higher domestic dollar rate and do not affect the output. 
These stylized facts seem to fit the Brazilian experience, as well as of several other 
emerging markets. 
 
The bulk of the difficulties Brazil now faces is derived from the unfortunate combination 
of higher risk aversion in international financial markets and greater uncertainty 
associated with the course of the future economic policy to be followed by the new 
administration, and to the sustainability of the Brazilian public debt. To avert a painful 
default, in the medium and long run, real interest rates must fall and sustained growth 
must resume. To increase the chances of success, several policy measures are suggested: 
•  To further the integration of Brazilian and international financial markets. This 
will help increase the amount of international liquidity of the economy; 
•  To increase the exportability of the economy. This implies both larger exports and 
larger imports. It is not akin to import substitution. More exports or more services 
and products that can be shifted to external markets represent further international 
liquidity. Import substitutes that can only survive protected by high tariffs do not 
increase international liquidity; 
•  To increase the fiscal effort in order to help dispel the doubts over the 
sustainability of the public debt. If the default risk premium is significantly 
reduced, the initial fiscal effort will support higher growth, lower interest 
expenditures and higher fiscal revenues. 
•  To increase the credibility of the monetary authority, by conferring instrument 
independence to the Brazilian Central Bank to use monetary policy to achieve the 
inflation target set outside the central bank. During crises, the large exchange rate 
depreciation caused by the reduction in aggregate international liquidity passes 
through domestic inflation, requiring a restrictive monetary policy from the BCB. 
Note that these episodes are usually associated with recessions, making the BCB’s 
contractionary monetary policy more painful and less credible. The stronger the 
BCB credibility, the lower the term premium caused by such episodes, the lower 
Selic rate hike by the BCB in attempting to keep inflation under control, and the 
lower the negative effect in economic activity.   23 
•  To resume the debt management efforts to lengthen the debt profile while 
reducing the indexation to the exchange rate and to the Selic short term rate. This 
will require larger use of inflation-linked bonds. 
 
When and if the international liquidity crisis is overcome, the above measures will help 
Brazil to lower the real interest rates and achieve sustained growth.   24 
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Chart 2B 
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Chart 3 
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Chart 4 
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Chart 6 
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